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VIA PACIS 



VIA PACI 

How Terms of Peace Can Be Auto- 
matically Prepared While 
the War Is Still 
Going On 



A Suggestion 
Offered by An American 

HAROLD F; McCORMICK 



Written December 1915 

Issued in Private Print July 1916 

Now Put Forward for Consideration by the Public 



A. C. McCLURG & CO. 
CHICAGO 

1917 



nit 



Copyright 

haeold f. Mccormick 

1917 



Published February 1917 



0; 

-9 1917 



YV, F* HALU PRINTING COMPANY, CMICA6Q 

©CI.A457015 
"1 f 



VIA PACIS 

FOREWORD 

The plan contained herein differs from all 
" peace proposals" that have been put for- 
ward hitherto in that it does not call for the 
immediate, early or in any sense " premature" 
cessation of hostilities. It is assumed that 
the war will continue its normal course, i. e. 
until one side has to accept peace terms formu- 
lated by the other. Thus the question is not 
one of discussion of peace, but of statement 
of peace terms. 

What is new is that the belligerents are 
asked, while continuing to conceal — as they 
are bound to do — their strategic plans, to 
enunciate the objects for which they are fight- 
ing and place their peace terms in precise and 
concrete form in the hands of selected neutral 
countries — whose role would be, not that of 
mediators but of custodians and "transfer 

II 



2 1 Foreword 

agents." The terms thus deposited could be 
changed periodically in accordance with the 
varying fortunes of the war, the resulting 
benefit being that each side could know at a 
given moment precisely what the other was 
demanding and could examine his own assets, 
chances and hopes accordingly. In other 
words, there would be obtained the quotation 
of the "cash value" of ultimate peace terms. 
It is contended that this would result in: mini- 
mum duration of war with maximum of use- 
ful effort, thus avoiding all superfluous loss 
of human life and economic waste. 



PROSPECTUS 

At present all eyes are on the War; but 
while the soldiers are fighting, Statesmanship 
is confined to home or kindred activities, and 
Diplomacy only at odd moments and by indi- 
rect methods is feeling its way. 

The war is in the open; diplomacy is under 
cover. In the war, there is a continuous point 
of contact; in diplomacy, there is no point of 
contact. In the war, by the grinding pro- 
cess of months, each side knows pretty well 
the status of the other and can reckon 
with it. 

To each side, all elements involved in 
ultimate Peace Terms are fairly well known to 
date, except the peace terms themselves. — 
Statesmanship is relatively silent on this point. 
In the war, reconnoitring can be carried out 
only to a limited extent; the contact is inevi- 

3 



4 Via Pacts 

table. — Statesmanship can rely at best only 
on reconnoitring through diplomacy and can- 
not utilize its full force at all; why? 
— Because there is no battle line for this 
activity. 

A battle is a blow. A peace overture is a 
hand held out. Peace Terms put forward are 
an armour of defense — a display of subjec- 
tive assurance with a definite objective. — 
While blows are raining, today every peace 
overture is withheld which is or would be of 
genuine portent, for fear of injury to the 
tenderer. By reason of its being construed 
as a sign of weakness, each side fears to 
propose anything like terms, because the 
other does not and the equilibrium would be 
lost. 

Meantime each awaits proposals from the 
other, thereby creating an impasse in this di- 
rection. And such terms as are indirectly and 
unofficially put out are intended, either as a 
show of strength to the other side, or as a 
stimulus for continued support and cause for 
loyalty in the minds of compatriots. Mean- 



Prospectus 5 

time again, the papers are full of vague re- 
ports about peace and each opposing govern- 
ment is busy disowning them, and saying it is 
for the other side to make proposals. 

Thus the battle is the only real force, physi- 
cal and moral, and diplomacy is weakened by 
its slightest genuine effort. — In war when one 
side advances the other side must meet it or 
lose great advantages. In diplomacy, when 
one side advances, the other side can hang 
back and lose no advantage. So, every move 
of diplomacy is looked upon with natural sus- 
picion and distrust, because there is no chance 
to advance or retire along definite and estab- 
lished lines. Consequently, it fails to exist as 
a vital force, or is simply embodied suspicion 
and distrust. So, at this stage, the soldiers' 
battle is far ahead of diplomacy, which as yet 
is confined to collateral activities and in the 
direct sense has not yet even started forward. 
As present factors, therefore, are noted the 
inherent failure of Diplomacy as such and 
the enforced inactivity of Statesmanship. A 
suggestion for the liberation of this latter 



6 Via Pacts 

force is submitted as an aid in the solution 
of the War Problem. 1 

Meantime on the usual basis, the war con- 
tinues, each side is struggling for "victory" 
— and what is victory? — a gain, the value of 
which is not yet known, — a faith — a belief 
in that which is not seen. But meanwhile the 
exhaustion of each side and its diminishing 
resources are seen, definitely in a subjective 
way, and generally in an objective way. — 
This is a known factor and a factor of a con- 
stantly increasing menace. This definite, in- 
creasing menace can be measured up by each 



1 An arbitrary and somewhat academic distinction 
is here made between the terms "Statesmanship" and 
''Diplomacy." The latter is used for the purpose of 
symbolising those efforts suggestive of "negotia- 
tions," "peace proposals," "peace overtures," "armis- 
tice," etc., which are not involved in the principle 
of this plan ; while the term "Statesmanship" is used 
as standing for those efforts involved in the prepa- 
ration and announcement of "Peace Terms." 
" 'Statesmanship' is the general, and 'diplomacy' the 
particular political activity. Between the two there 
is not opposition, but distinction of degree" and 
sphere. 



Prospectus 7 

respective side, only against the vague and in- 
definite, though decisive object, victory, with 
all its illusions and delusions and with its un- 
known ultimate dimension or with its unreck- 
onable inclination towards one side or the 
other. This vague and indefinite object there- 
fore is the goal each side is struggling to reach 
for recuperation and for the justification of 
all its efforts. Will one side or the other win 
victory unconditionally and the other side sus- 
tain a correspondingly crushing " defeat," or 
will the conclusion, if divination could reveal 
it now, possess those elements of such uncer- 
tain value as to render the term "victory," 
disputable and rather a composite, for each 
side, of good and bad, of satisfactory and 
unsatisfactory components? Thus are pre- 
sented the alternatives of unqualified victory 
for one side and a commensurate defeat for 
the other or an outcome containing mingled 
elements of both victory and defeat for either 
side. 

Within a decade, say, there will have to be 
peace; one side or other will have to make 



8 Via Pacts 

overtures sooner or later; or intervention of 
some sort will occur; or the good offices of 
mediation will be accepted or sought; or sur- 
render will be brought about unconditionally. 
Within this period, statesmanship will have 
to assert itself and make decisions. A protocol 
will have to be signed. Terms will have to 
be made known. All the costs, damages and 
aspirations will have to be considered and 
weighed, each by its own side as well as by 
the other, save in the case of unconditional 
surrender. During this coming epoch of en- 
forced activity, statesmanship will be forced 
to place itself in harmony with the fortunes 
up-to-date of the respective armies and navies. 
Statesmanship will therefore under tremen- 
dous pressure and within a comparatively 
short space of time, have to close up the 
" gap " existing between its own inactivities, 
and the progressive activities of the respective 
armies and navies. Diplomacy, on the other 
hand, and on the part of each side, will en- 
deavor to procrastinate and hoodwink and 
manoeuvre for position to obtain the best 



Prospectus 9 

terms, demanding and declining as if the last 
word were being uttered. Meanwhile in the 
field and on the seas, the truth of fact will 
have prevailed. During the armistice, the 
truth of an idea would be expounded. L The 
acts of war would be overvalued or dis- 
counted from the point of view of self-interest 
and, having reached the stage of negotiations, 
the situation would be taken from the realm 
of fact into that of conjecture and specula- 
tion. 

Meantime a rupture might occur and the 
armistice be broken. Therefore why should 
statesmanship await "the inevitable hour" of 
peace, instead of facing its problems now? 

In the past, there have been "religious" 
wars, and " political " wars, and wars for con- 
quest of territory purely, but the incentives to 
this present war, apart from the paramount 
questions of humanity, freedom, etc., have 
arisen out of commerce and trade; to attain 
the desired end, every expedient of a commer- 
cial nature has been brought to bear. Both 
sides are making a business of the war, Two 



io Via Pads 

gigantic business organizations have been 
evolved as never before. In all branches of 
activity, past precedents have been set aside. 
New methods have been adopted. The re- 
sources and ingenuities of the 20th century 
have been invoked. So, why not apply these 
same principles now to the question of Ulti- 
mate Peace and Peace Terms and make a busi- 
ness of that; a business enterprise collateral 
to other war activities of a humanitarian or 
economic nature. 

Why not reverse the well recognized axiom 
" when in peace prepare for war " to meet the 
present situation and thus adapt to our pur- 
pose a new principle : " When in war prepare 
for peace"? This parallel by opposites may 
not be so far amiss, because in peace when a 
nation prepares for war, it is not alone for 
the purpose of the possession of the equip- 
ment, but largely for the security the knowl- 
edge of its possession affords, inasmuch as 
it can be reckoned with as a known quantity. 
If the preparations had to be made secretly 
and without revealing strength, there might 



Prospectus n 

be less tendency on the part of that nation to 
arm and a corresponding tendency on the part 
of the rival to take a mistaken leap in the 
dark. Hence the occasion of past " warlike 
demonstrations. " — Again, in peace time, war 
is spoken of in hushed tones, as now peace is 
referred to. 

The better side of human nature wants 
peace, however, and the suggestion contained 
in this article is to utilise the " preambles of 
peace" in war-time (keeping them constantly 
in view while the war is going on) , just as war- 
like demonstrations are used in time of peace ; 
and on the other hand to speak openly and 
frankly to each other about peace terms now, 
contrary to the customary silence about war 
in time of peace. 

And How Would This Be Done? 

Why not formulate and exchange peace terms 
now, and thus change the future indefinite 
activities of statesmanship to real activities 
of the present time? 



12 Via Pads 

Why not bring from the future to the present 
the knowledge of peace terms? 

Why not advance the question of Peace Terms 
from being an unknown quantity to-day to 
that of a known quantity? 

Why not have a "battle line of terms" just 
as definite and yet as variable and flexible 
as the military " front" itself? 

Why not make provision for Peace Terms to 
fluctuate by successive changes made from 
time to time according to the varying for- 
tunes and the then chosen policies? 

Why not make Peace Terms known, each to 
the other, and thus add, to mutual knowl- 
edge of the situation progressively as to the 
fighting, and of the situation progressively 
as to economic conditions, a knowledge of 
the situation progressively as to Terms of 
Peace? Then let the war go on, until one 
side or the other stops and accepts the then 
conditions of peace as named by the other. 



Prospectus 13 

This plan discounts the future only as it 
brings to the present a Cash Value basis of 
all that either side would demand as a " sine 
qua non" to peace. Progressive success by 
arms in the field would be the ultimate meas- 
ure of justification of such stated Peace 
Terms, and this would be the case, whether 
the Peace Terms were stated beforehand, or 
not. In the suggestion herein made of Peace 
Terms imposed, the war proceeds freely and 
uninterruptedly without arbitrary interference 
or negotiations, as such; Statesmanship on 
both sides simply puts forward the Terms of 
Peace: a statement of Terms on a "take it" 
or "leave it" basis — the principle of this 
plan being that Knowledge is Power in its 
most effective form. 



II 

THE PLAN 

The features of this " Peace Terms Plan" 
are that: 

i. Upon some mutually agreed date each 
belligerent 1 should make known to the other 
side, in a formal and binding way, through 
the good offices of neutral states (or such 
other channel as may be agreed upon) the 
definite and precise conditions, both as to 
demands and concessions, upon which he will 
accept peace upon notice given by the other 
side, and that meantime he is fighting for their 
adoption; and that, from time to time, he has 
the right to change these according to the fluc- 
tuations of the war and his own desires and 
necessities, or to harmonize them with his 
adversary's terms. 

2. The consequence of the foregoing will 
be a knowledge, upon a possible sliding scale, 



1 The term "Belligerent" is used as meaning one 
of two enemy groups of states. 

14 



The Plan 15 

of exactly what each side is struggling for, 
with the result that either side may at any time 
make a computation : — 

a. as to exactly what his terms are, 

b. as to what his successes are, 

c. as to what his resources are, 

and can compare these factors, with the condi- 
tions offered, as well as with the correspond- 
ing factors of the other side. 

3. Provided with the foregoing data, each 
belligerent can cast up the entire situation, 
having all factors known and at his command, 
and can determine just how long, all things 
considered, it will pay him to continue the 
war. 

4. The purpose of this plan is to shorten 
the war and bring it to an end within the mini- 
mum length of time consistent with the maxi- 
mum effective effort and full use of all 
resources which will count, and to avoid a pro- 
longation of the war beyond the effective 
point. Human life, effort and economic waste 
beyond this point are saved. This advantage 



1 6 Via Pads 

applies equally to both sides and is arrived at 
by their knowing, as against not knowing, the 
terms for which the struggle is going on. 

5. Having knowledge of the terms, each 
side knows when the limit of the effective 
effort has been reached; without this, each side 
struggles in the dark, beyond the effective 
point, to useless exhaustion, each in the blind 
endeavor to outreach the other, without 
reckoning the cost. 

6. When the end comes, according to this 
plan, the terms will already have been arrived 
at "ipse facto" and the peace settlement con- 
cluded ready for final documentary form and 
signature. 

7. This plan involves no attempt to alter 
the outcome of the war as at present waged. 



Ill 

GOOD OFFICES OF NEUTRAL COUNTRIES 

It is assumed that neutral countries, out of 
self-interest as well as neighbourliness would 
agree to propose this plan to the belligerents, 
if such act of proposal were known to be ac- 
ceptable to them, or would welcome any re- 
quest made jointly by the belligerents to serve 
as intermediaries, 1 and would faithfully carry 
out any undertaking entrusted to them. A 
group of four neutral countries is suggested 
in this capacity to insure a " composite " of 
" average " neutrality in spirit as well as of- 
ficially and to the letter. And thus perhaps, 



1 Perhaps the terms "Custodians," "Transfer 
agents," or "Registrars" would be better appellations 
and more suitable to designate the responsibilities 
involved in this plan, as they are "static" rather than 
"plastic" in nature. The distinction is here made 
between "intermediaries" implying channel for nego- 
tiations and "custodians" as channels for statements 
of Peace Terms. 

n 



1 8 Via Pacts 

such four neutral countries might be selected 
as would secure a cohesive third party to the 
plan; a party welded together solely for the 
fulfillment of the functions allotted to it and 
which by exercising concentrated influence as 
" custodians " of the original documents con- 
taining the respective Peace Terms, might be- 
come a moral guarantee for the faithful and 
impartial operation of the plan. 



PROVISIONS OF THE PLAN 

Provision 1. Beginning from some stipu- 
lated time, each belligerent agrees, until fur- 
ther notice, or until the end of the war, which- 
ever alternative is decided upon, to send 
monthly, or at any intermediate date or at 
such intervals as may be agreed upon, to the 
government seat of each selected neutral coun- 
try, or through such other channel as may be 
agreed upon, a full duly authenticated state- 
ment of the terms (accompanied by one set 
of copies), upon which each will agree to 
stop the war upon notice being given by the 
other. 

Provision 2. A full statement of terms is 
held to mean the principle of each demand 
exacted or point conceded, fully and clearly 
set forth, so that in substance the position is 
entirely enunciated, and all demands and con- 

19 



20 yja Pads 

cessions, taken collectively, form the Peace 
Terms of that particular belligerent. 1 

Provision 3. The neutral governments 
agree to send copies to each of the belligerents 
upon the receipt of the originals, which the 
neutral countries keep in their possession. 

Provision 4- The neutral governments 
agree to certify to the accuracy of the docu- 
ments as received and of the copies. 

Provision 5. The neutral governments 
agree to notify either belligerent, upon hear- 



' 1 Each side stating what it yields (if anything) as 
well as what it demands is a vital part of the pro- 
posal : 

a. For the purpose of comparison of Terms. 

b. To harmonize this plan with what would 
occur in the ordinary method of fighting 
first and then negotiating. 

c. So that the terms of either side, if and when 
accepted by the other, would form the pre- 
pared substance for Peace Documents, just 
as each side would want them to be in- 
cluded in the protocol of the final Treaty 
of peace. 



Provisions of the Plan 21 

ing from the one that peace is desired upon the 
then basis of the other's terms. 

Provision 6. The neutral governments 
agree, in case of a request from either bellig- 
erent for further information regarding the 
exact interpretation of the other's terms, to 
forward such request and upon receipt of the 
reply to transmit it to the inquirer. 

Provision 7. The respective belligerents 
bind themselves to send at such periods as are 
agreed upon, a new and authentic set of terms ; 
or, in the event of their not doing so then, or 
during any succeeding period, it is understood 
that the last set of terms holds good until new 
terms are received by the neutral countries, 
and copies forwarded in due course. 

Provision 8. It is understood and agreed 
that each belligerent, in forwarding new 
terms, has the right and the power to change 
or amend the terms of the preceding period as 
sent out by him, without restriction whatever. 

Provision 9. Each belligerent agrees, that, 
in the event of not fully understanding at any 
time the full import of any point or principles 



22 Via Pacts 

contained in any demand set forth by the 
other, he will promptly address a communi- 
cation to the neutral countries asking for fur- 
ther light on this or these subjects and each 
belligerent agrees to furnish further explana- 
tion to the other upon request by the neutral 
countries. In the event of there being no 
such request, it is assumed that the Peace 
Terms are clearly understood by the other. 

Provision 10. Each belligerent agrees that 
it will be bound by its own terms, if and as 
accepted by the other. 

Provision 11. Each belligerent agrees that 
no terms will be understood to exist or will 
be imposed except those contained in the origi- 
nal documents placed in the keeping of the 
selected neutral countries and in the duly au- 
thenticated copies that have been sent to the 
belligerents themselves. 



OBJECTIONS TO THE PLAN 

I. One or the other side might be unwill- 
ing to "show his hand" to the extent of an- 
nouncing his Peace Terms now, whilst having 
to fight for them. Terms put forward by the 
less successful side (at the time) might seem 
out of proportion to his successes. He might 
prefer to keep them to himself. And the ap- 
parently successful one might hesitate to pub- 
lish terms tending to stiffen the resistance of 
the other. Each side might think, that, as 
possible ultimate loser, he would be stating 
demands which later on would prove to be not 
realizable, whereas under the present exist- 
ing conditions this particular side would have 
kept his unfulfilled wish officially to himself, 
thereby avoiding subsequent humiliation. 
Naturally these would be fatal objections, as 
any other such would be. But every one now 
knows each side is fighting for something. 

23 



24 Via Pads 

Basic propositions are set forth clearly, even 
definitely and authoritatively. To-day each 
side has already gone openly " on record" in 
official statements of peace terms of a general 
character. Why not now "clinch" the mat- 
ter, by transforming such vague propositions 
into systematic and complete terms, stamped 
with the official seal? 

2. It might be said, that there is no bond 
for the fulfillment of this plan and that one 
side, having tried it, might find it a hardship 
and withdraw from further participation, or 
act contrary in other ways to the agreement. 
The answer to this objection is, that the pur- 
pose of the plan is one which should appeal 
to both sides as a matter of " mutual self- 
interest" — the only bond that belligerents 
would recognise in any plan. But beyond this 
it is submitted, that in effect the " custodian- 
ship " of neutral countries would provide a 
moral bond of most definite character and 
clear interpretation. 

3. Again it may be argued, that by follow- 
ing this plan, the terms of each side might in 



Objections to the Plan 25 

time assume such stupendous proportions that 
each side, in hate and desperation, would pre- 
fer to perish, in prolonging the war, rather 
than accept the burden and shame involved in 
surrender. In reply to this, it is suggested that 
such stupendous terms would, after all, reflect 
to some extent the dimensions of the internal 
loss; and the same spirit that would suggest 
compromise ordinarily, might in the working 
of this plan also suggest lowering the terms, 
as time went on, to tempt the other to yield. 
By lowering the terms there would be, in 
effect, the absorption of the excess and the 
" pocketing " of the loss; and it is presumed 
that the then more successful belligerent 
would be tired of prolonging the struggle as 
well as the less successful one. 

4. An objection might be raised on the 
ground that this plan provides for no com- 
promise. That is true. But if it did provide 
for compromise, it is fairly certain that neither 
belligerent would put forward its terms, in 
a sincere spirit, as " demands " to be insisted 
upon, (keeping them, in self-interest at the 



26 Via Pacts 

lowest possible point) ; but such terms would 
undoubtedly be then put forward as an " ask- 
ing" price, in the belief that a settlement 
would be made subsequently upon a lower 
basis in the course of negotiations. Such a 
provision for negotiation on the part of bel- 
ligerents, or of arbitration by neutral coun- 
tries, would defeat the purpose of the plan 
by causing an inflation of " Peace Terms," in- 
stead of the desired result of a deflation. // 
the present plan were adopted, negotiation 
would be eliminated as a factor. The situation 
would inevitably resolve itself into one in 
which the respective peace terms and war for- 
tunes of each side would harmonize more or 
less automatically, the one with the other. 
Then both sides would fight on, until one side 
came to the decision to accept the responsi- 
bility of being the first to signify a desire for 
the conclusion of the war on the terms of the 
other, as against sustaining further loss. This 
would constitute what might be deemed sur- 
render ; but it might, for all that, be the wiser 
course. The loss involved would be the ac- 



Objections to the Plan 27 

ceptance of the terms exacted by the other; 
the gain would be a saving of further internal 
loss through the prolongation of the war. 
Consequently, the immediate loss sustained in 
surrendering would be partly offset by the gain 
in conservation of further energy and effort 
beyond the effective point. In the long run, 
the side whose terms would be in the greater 
disharmony with the war fortunes would be 
the one that could not continue and which 
would be forced to sue for peace. 

In general response to these and various 
other objections, it is submitted that the trial 
and subsequent abandonment of this plan 
would leave the situation at no time substan- 
tially worse off than if it were not tried ; where- 
as the alternative result of the trial would be 
success, and the question therefore resolves 
itself into the proposition: 

Is It Worth While to Try? 

Heretofore statements have been made 
officially as to what will be accomplished, in 



28 Via Pads 

order that certain demands may be enforced. 
This plan leaves out the "what will be" and 
reduces the situation to "what is," keeping 
pace, as it were, with the armies in the field. 



VI 

ARGUMENTS FOR THE PLAN 

1. The close of the war would not be the 
result of a blind struggle to exhaustion, butt 
would be due to the opportunity to exercise 
intelligent foresight, with all factors clearly 
known. 

2. Terms can be studied and put out by 
each side with more care by making use of 
the intervening time, rather than by leaving 
everything to the restricted time of the final 
peace negotiations. 

3. Each side can compare the terms of the 
other with its own resources and fortunes and 
can determine just how long it pays to keep 
up the war. Month by month and period by 
period, as each side sees the terms of the 
other, the tendency will be to yield the un- 
important and hold to the important. Thus, 
so far as the respective fortunes of the war 
allow it, the " opposing " terms will get nearer 

29 



30 Via Pads 

to one another all the time and become simpli- 
fied by the process of elimination. This plan 
contains therefore the principles of " natural 
selection " and of the " survival of the fittest," 
the discarding of the least desirable, involv- 
ing, by the time the terms " get set " and recon- 
ciled, the greatest number of desired points 
considered possible by each side. And thus it 
gives each side a chance to know what the 
Other is driving at, and to make comparisons. 
The exchange which one belligerent makes for 
the benefit of knowing the terms of the other 
is to allow the other side to know his terms 
rn return, and even this feature would be ex- 
pected to work to the advantage of the first 
rn the long run. 

4. It will tend to put a stop to all extrava- 
gant discussion and do away with the infor- 
mal, yet officially spoken challenges, counter 
charges and aspersions at present unavoidably 
indulged in. These have the painful effect 
of multiplying and expanding the original 
grievances in cumulative form as the despera- 
tion of the situation increases, with the result 



Arguments for the Plan 31 

that fresh animosities grow out of the origi- 
nal grievances, so that the realm of fact is 
abandoned for that of delusion. The plan 
here proposed tends to keep these artificialities 
down to a working basis. 

5. The minds of the belligerents would in- 
evitably be partially turned from the total con- 
centration upon the scene of war, and would 
find room for thoughts of peace while at war. 
— The psychology of the situation would ad- 
just itself to the normal balance of all things, 
and the various belligerents, instead of flying 
into the face of despair or following the path 
of unknown destiny, would be dealing in 
known quantities. A receptive attitude to- 
wards peace would evolve , and " to define 
Terms of Peace would take away the worst 
fears . . ." 

6. It takes account of any questions of right 
or wrong, or justice or injustice, as such, for 
those claims on either side would be practi- 
cally embodied in the Peace Terms. No at- 
tempt to invade the realm of the " amour- 
propre" of either belligerent nor to lessen 



32 Via Pacts 

their rightful sensibilities is involved. It is 
not intended to be material in this concept. 
But the point is emphasized, that in the ordi- 
nary nature of things all these claims of senti- 
ment would be eventually expressed in the ulti- 
mate terms of peace at the close of the war, 
to the fullest extent on each side; and the 
proposition is simply submitted that these 
could be stated in their equivalents now, as 
well as later. 

7. It may appeal alike to those who want 
the war to keep up, and to those who want 
peace to be brought about. In this contradic- 
tion, the distinction lies in the different view- 
points from which the war is regarded: one 
section seeing in the continuance of the war 
the best way to realize national aspirations, 
or to get safely out of a predicament; while 
another may desire to see peace established 
for the same reasons. To reconcile these dif- 
ferent viewpoints (according to the "prag- 
matic principle"), it is submitted that a full 
knowledge of Peace Terms would substitute 
for the shadowy horizon, the "sunlight of 



Arguments for the Plan 33 

consciousness" by which the exact differences 
and realizable possibilities of harmony could 
be clearly seen as time went on. It is cer- 
tain that neither side could reasonably say 
now, in objection to this proposal, that it 
"does not want to discuss peace," for that is 
not the question. The question is not one 
of discussion of peace, but of statement of 
Terms of Peace, 

If one or other side does not want to 
discuss peace, it is presumably because he 
believes victory will eventually be his on 
his own terms. Nothing in this plan pre- 
cludes such a result. 

8. There is nothing to prevent either side 
making its terms as high as is wanted, putting 
what is in its mind upon paper and thus giv- 
ing the conception a stated form. Knowing 
in general now, what the last stage of desire is, 
each side could just as well already embody 
such terms, while peace itself is not yet at 
hand. The announcement would not prevent 
the demander from getting them, if he is so 
confident, and their realization might even 



34 Via Pacts 

be hastened. All depends on success, as would 
be the case in any event. 

9. Exorbitant or out-of-proportion terms, 
eventually would not pay, for the reason that 
the divergence between the dimension of such 
terms and the fortune of war of that particu- 
lar belligerent would become so perceptible 
that the other side would prefer to go on fight- 
ing. The belligerent putting forward exces- 
sive terms, would have to reduce them, if he 
was hard pressed, because he would come to 
realize that he could not get peace until he 
did. Each side "could afford to define the 
terms of a just peace." 

Any victories gained by one belligerent dur- 
ing any given period, immediately resulting in 
a call for peace by the other belligerent could 
not be rightly claimed to justify an increase or 
rise in the terms of the former as previously 
announced, and this for two reasons: 

First. The former terms hold good 
and binding up to that time, without 
any " extras." — 



Arguments for the Plan 35 

Second. The fact that such victories 
cause the other side to call for Peace 
should make them be looked upon as 
paying for themselves on a " Quid-pro- 
quo" basis without further compensa- 
tion resulting, because they are the 
instruments and means by and through 
which the victor's terms then outstand- 
ing are secured. No victories imagin- 
able within this period, and pending a 
new set of peace terms, would be 
cheaply bought, if such victories were 
the immediate and direct cause of the 
acceptance of the victor's terms by the 
then defeated side. 

If on the other hand such victories did not 
result in a suspension of hostilities, they could 
well be included and expressed and recognized 
in the next set of Peace Terms put forward 
by the belligerent realizing such victories, in 
the form of a fluctuation upward of his Peace 
Terms, as compared with the last set. 

10. It would prevent a premature peace on 



3 6 Via Pacts 

terms unsatisfactory to either side and would 
minimize the chance of a renewal of hostili- 
ties. If each side went to the limit of efficiency, 
the loser would realize at the end that it had 
done its best, thus leaving no justifiable re- 
morse for unexpended effort, with its baneful 
effect upon future points of view and averting 
the immediate danger of that malignant spec- 
tre — "reprisals." 

ii. It would make for the better under- 
standing which always accompanies the spirit 
of frankness and candour, however distaste- 
ful the existing situation might be. Spies to- 
day do not have the recognition of military 
honor as do soldiers in uniform. Just so it 
is submitted that a "battle line of Peace 
Terms" inspired and decreed by Statesman- 
ship, would place this method on the same 
footing as straight forward war activities. 

12. The feature of "fluctuations" meets 
the point of those who would object to the an- 
nouncement of Peace Terms now, on the 
ground that, if announced now, and crystal- 
lized in single final form, they would become 



Arguments for the Plan 37 

obsolete by reason of future events and 
changed conditions, and that therefore it 
would be better to await the end in order that 
the terms might be dealt with under the then 
existing conditions. The provision for " fluc- 
tuations" possesses the advantage of knowl- 
edge of present terms, without the disadvan- 
tage of their becoming obsolete. No Peace 
Terms could be announced now which would 
be final in form and could hold good for all 
time to come. They could not be put out in 
such form with sincere conviction as to their 
continuous value. "Fluctuations" would 
keep the periodically contemporary peace 
terms ever applicable, ever sincere and ever 
effective until the end. Each set of peace 
terms put out would possess full current value. 
13. The adoption of this plan would tend 
to maintain the unity of each of the two bel- 
ligerent groups of nations. No one can be 
blind to the fact, that great efforts are being 
made at present (witness the recent and immi- 
nent congresses) to secure for each side 
strategic and economic unity. This ought to 



3 8 Via Pads 

be of good augury for the proposed com- 
munity of action regarding peace terms. The 
formulation and announcement of one set of 
Peace Terms by each side would constitute a 
further bond of union and afford a stronger 
guarantee. The war would then comprise 
only two sides, each absolutely consolidated, 
and pledged to act, all for one and one for 
all. 

14. The Plan places the outcome of the 
war upon a net " Cash-Value" basis of liqui- 
dation for any given date, as against that of a 
"negotiable note" with a long future ma- 
turity. It is like a draft " on demand." It 
might also be likened to a " one price " trans- 
action over the counter, regarding a recog- 
nized commodity, the price fluctuating under 
the law of demand and supply, as against bar- 
ter and trade over an article of unknown and 
individual value. "The suggestion is that 
they (the belligerents) should define not in 
abstract phrases but in fairly concrete terms 
the price of peace." 

15. In general, each set of terms put for- 



Arguments for the Plan 39 

ward would presumably tend to embody the 
increased cost of the war during the previous 
period, and so the terms of each would be a 
constantly rising tide, subject only to fluctua- 
tions, independent of this steady increase. 
This steadily increasing tax officially stated, 
with its deep significance and world wide 
effect, could hardly fail to have and to hold 
the attention of the belligerents. Its grow- 
ing size would cause the " battle line of terms " 
to become as potential a factor of considera- 
tion and deliberation as the war strategy it- 
self and its results. The " means" and the 
"end" would go side by side. The cost of 
"victory," or the prolongation of the war 
could be measured at one time with the value 
of the prize or of a partition of it. The " net " 
result would have its just recognition. 

16. Every month the toll of human lives 
increases in terrifying proportions. Every 
month by which the war could be shortened 
would save therefore countless lives. It is 
by no means certain that a premature peace 
would save lives in the long run, for the dan- 



4& Via Pacts 

ger of a fresh outbreak of hostilities would 
persist. But suppose a war continued up to 
the last effective point, but not one minute be- 
yond, how great the saving in human life on 
both sides would then be ! Then tragic as the 
war is at best, it would be a humane war by 
comparison, if it stopped the minute it became 
certain to one side that further effort was 
vain. 

* * * 

In closing one might venture to suggest that 
imagination can picture three bases upon any 
one of which the war might be settled: 

First. Upon conditions which include 
principles relating to permanent unity 
among nations, definitions of interna- 
tional rights, tribunals for settling differ- 
ences — all tremendous and eternity 
reaching problems. 

Second. Upon conditions relating to a 
final and comprehensive settlement of the 



Arguments for the Plan 4 1 

immediate issues at stake, immense as 
they are. 

Third. Upon conditions unsatisfac- 
tory and incomplete, arrived at under 
pressure and by negotiation, and leaving 
a feeling on both sides of unfinished dif- 
ferences. 

The First may be too much to expect as the 
direct outcome of this war. 

The Third might be considered deplorable. 

The Second would seem to be more nearly 
the outcome which this Plan seeks to attain. 



VII 

CONCLUSION 

It is realized, in submitting these pages, — 
it may be presumptuously — that it is a big 
task outlined and suggested. One may have 
only limited faith in its applicability, owing to 
the many obstacles which would be encoun- 
tered at every turn; and yet it does seem as 
though it might serve the purpose claimed, 
if it could be put into operation as a matter of 
self-interest. Under the stress of a time like 
this, when human life is at stake at every 
move, each suggestion of a helpful purpose 
has its proper place and value and perhaps this 
one has some place and some value. At any 
rate, it is put forward in a submissive attitude 
of understanding, that very likely it may go 
for naught. If, however, this suggestion 
should be the means of prompting some other 
of more practical application, or should reach 
some of the belligerents so that its content, 

42 



Conclusion 43 

as a general proposal, would receive consid- 
eration, it will then have served in one or other 
way its purpose. 

With merely practical aims in view, no at- 
tempt has been made to consider the past 
literature. 

To those who, with untiring zeal and 
friendly interest, have rendered kind assist- 
ance in the development and elaboration of 
this idea, I make grateful acknowledgment. 

Harold F. McCormick, 
of Chicago. 

Hotel Baur-Au-Lac ; Zurich. 



VIII 

POSSIBLE SUPPLEMENT TO PLAN 

A supplemental feature might be added 
to this plan, if it was thought desirable, by 
incorporating the element of "Publicity." In 
this event the neutral countries, upon receiv- 
ing the various documents containing the 
Terms of each side, in addition to handing 
them privately to each belligerent in exchange, 
according to the regular plan thus far pro- 
posed, could be allowed to publish them 
simultaneously and officially in the newspapers 
of their respective countries. In this way 
the Peace Terms would be " Publicly Pro- 
claimed." The Status of Peace Terms, would 
be known to the World, as in the case of the 
War Status. "Statesmanship'' would come 
out " in the open." There would be an open 
battle line of Peace Terms. The world would 
turn to thoughts of peace while at war. There 
would be afforded to all, enlightened knowl- 

44 



Possible Supplement 45 

edge of the fighting objective of each side, 
changing apprehension to assurance, mysti- 
fication to clearness. It would be like a 
" score-card," or a " listing of securities " on 
an exchange. No doubt this feature, if it 
were practicable, would give a wonderfully 
added strength to the plan as a whole, as 
helping to secure fulfillment by illuminating 
dignity and honour. Nations have guarded, 
from time immemorial, with jealous concern 
a spotless escutcheon on these two counts. 
Why should it be unnatural to consider of 
great value a like sensitiveness in carrying out 
such a plan as is proposed in these pages, 
involving not only from a National, but 
also from an International point of view, a 
step towards the solution of a question of 
such magnitude as the world has never seen 
hitherto in its history? 



VIA PAGIS 



Chart Illustration 



TO 



<4 How Terms of Peace 
can be Automatically Prepared 
While the War is Still Going On" 



HAROLD F. MCCORMICK 



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